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Quinlan Re-Examined 
by 
Paul A. Byrne, M.D., Edward J. Kurt, Jr. J.D., Donald D. Campbell, J.D., 
Richard G. Nilges, M.D., Carlos Alberto de Carvalho, M.D., Anne M. 
Perone, J.D., Joseph C. Evers, M.D., and Richard J. Traynor, J.D. 
Introduction 
We re-examined the Quinlan case in light of unfortunate subsequent 
developments, especially the "Right to Die" movement which has swept the 
country like a pestilence in the past ten years. We believe that the only just and 
heroic stance in her otherwise miserable case history was that made by the 
medical and nursing attendants who tried to protect her from pro-death 
enthusiasts. All the others, the Court, the amicus curiae of the Roman Catholic 
Church, the so-called experts on life and death were in a fog of uncertainty about 
fundamental medical issues and apparently had little or no conception of the 
social consequences of their recommendations and decisions. The family, 
accepting the current rage to declare brain death in all with any significant 
impairment of cerebral function, were blindly led by the blind. 
We dare to quote what Adolf Hitler once said in one of his rambling 
monologs: " ... some must perish so that others can live."! Yes, current so-called 
"ethics" demands "justice for all,"2 not for the individual patient (especially ifhe 
or she is a social burden). We say, not only justice but happiness for others 
purchased by the sacrifice of a victim, a still-living victim, a victim of persoanl 
misconduct perhaps, but often only a misfortune. Karen was a profoundly 
disabled person, but wasn't she still a person entitled to protection? Costs are not 
mentioned in the Quinlan case, but they must have been considerable: the last ten 
years of her life were in a nursing home. The most recent bioethical thought and 
legal judgements would indicate that "cost-effectiveness" can justify setting aside 
the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act.3 The court's decision in 
the Karen Quinlan case was perhaps a prototype of such legal discrimination. 
Her case is a paradigm of what could happen to everyone not measuring up to 
society'S standards of what constitutes "normality." 
The pages of the Journal of the American Medical Association and the New 
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England Journal of Medicine are neither holy writ nor the last word on any 
subject. But they are too often treated as such. They have a definite and very 
expedient political agenda regarding death and euthanasia. Dissent is often 
excluded. As an example of the pro-death bias of the editorial policy of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, we mention the publication, in 
1988 of "Its Over, Debbie,"5 an anonymously written article describing the 
killing of a supposedly terminal cancer patient by the author, a hospital resident. 
We would present here a different picture of the Quinlan debacle. We humbly 
request the right to be heard before this culture of death envelops all of us in a 
gloomy and desperate future. 
The Re-examination 
"On the night of April 15, 1975, for reasons still unclear, Karen Quinlan 
ceased breathing for at least two fifteen minute periods."6 She died ten years after 
her cardio-respiratory arrest, having never regained consciousness. The cause of 
her unconsciousness was never clearly established. 
The case report in the New England Journal of Medicine [hereafter case report] 
indicates Karen had ingested alcohol and prescription sedatives.4 It has been 
suggested that she may have taken aspirin7 and even may have fallen.8 
According to the case report, Karen was resuscitated and had resumed 
spontaneous breathing and normal vital signs within an hour. The following 12 
hours witnessed sequential improvement as she responded to pain, coughed, and 
gagged. She moved all extremities spontaneously and opened her eyes in 
response to auditory stimuli. A tracheostomy was performed on the second day 
to facilitate the ventilatory assistance she required.4 
The experts testified that in addition to being comatose, Karen was in a 
"chronic and persistent vegetative state," having no awareness of anyone or 
anything around her and that she existed at a primitive reflex level. They 
admitted that she evidenced some brain stem functions (ineffective for 
respiration) and exhibited other reactions one customarily associates with being 
alive, such as moving, reacting to light, sound and noxious stimuli, blinking her 
eyes, and the like. "She grimaces, makes stereotyped cries and sounds, and has 
chewing motions. Her blood pressure is normal."6 
Karen's father, Joseph Quinlan, petitioned the New Jersey court to be 
appointed legal guardian of his adult daughter. He sought the express power to 
authorize the termination of all extraordinary procedures sustaining Karen's life, 
since her attending physicians, who were guided by "pertinent medical standards 
and practices," were precluded from removing her respirator.6 
The trial court, in its pretrial conference order (R. 4:25-1 et. seq.) of 
September 22, 1975, entered certain "factual and legal contentions," including as 
follows: 
I. Legal and Medical Death. (a) Under the existing legal and medical definitions of death 
recognized by the State of New Jersey, Karen Ann Quinlan is dead. 
This contention of "brain death" was discarded during trial by a stipulated 
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amendment that "Karen Ann Quinlan is presently alive."6 
In its opinion expressed in In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, An Alleged 
Incompetent, the New Jersey Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) described 
Karen as being in "a debilitated and allegedly moribund state," and described her 
posture as being "fetal-like and grotesque."6 
The experts appearing before the Court testified that Karen could not survive 
without the assistance of the respirator. They indicated there was strong 
likelihood that she would die soon after its removal. The Court noted that "No 
physician risked the opinion that she could live more than a year and indeed she 
may die much earlier."6 
The Court further found that it "seemed to be the consensus not only of the 
treating physicians but also of the several qualified experts who testified in the 
case, that removal from the respirator would not conform to medical practices, 
standards and traditions."6 . 
At the hearing to consider Mr. Quinlan'S application for guardianship, several 
medical and neurological experts, including Dr. Julius Korein and Dr. Fred 
Plum, testified that Karen Quinlan was indubitably not brain dead. They cited 
the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School as the "ordinary 
medical standard for determining brain death." Karen's condition did not 
conform either to its criteria for brain death9 or to similar criteris. to 
Karen was unresponsive and had flexion of the upper extremities and 
extension of her lower extremities, a position associated with partial 
decerebration. She had sleep-wake cycles. "In the awake cycle she blinks, cries 
out and does things of that sort but is still totally unaware of anyone or anything 
around her."6 
Karen's treating neurologist characterized the result of her electoren-
cephalogram (EEG) as "abnormal but it showed some activity and was 
consistent with her clinical state."6 The case report notes "Electroen-
cephalograms showed cortical activity (predominately low-voltage fast activity 
[beta] when the patient was awake. When she appeared to be asleep, there was 
intermittent low-voltage of 3 to 7 Hz (theta), infrequent activity in the alpha 
range, and occasional slower activity in the delta range,"4 activities consistent 
with a person who is asleep.11 Other neurological tests that were within normal 
limits included a brain scan, an angiogram, and a lumbar puncture.6 
Mr. Quinlan visited his daughter daily. In 1985, after Karen had lived some ten 
years in coma, he stated, "I still have to stop there everyday, even in the snow,just 
to be sure she is not lacking for anything."8 
I talk to her, see if there is anything I can do to make her comfortable. Sometimes there is. 
If she is grimacing, there are little things I can do like moving her feet or combing her 
hair. It makes me feel good to know there are little things I can do to see her sleeping 
peacefully when I leave.12 
Karen's adoptive parents are Catholic. Their pastor and bishop testified on 
their behalf, claiming the removal of Karen's respirator was consistent with 
Catholic teaching, citing Pope Pius XII.6 The New Jersey Conference of Catholic 
Bishops filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Mr. Quinlan'S application. 
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Noting "the position of that Church as illuminated by the record before us," 
the Court found: 
We have no reason to believe that it would be at all discordant with the whole of 
Judeo-Christian tradition, considering its central respect and reverence for the sanctity of 
human life.6 
In considering Karen's right to privacy, the Court found that Karen would 
have chosen to forgo the resuscitative treatment, had she been competent to make 
such a choice, reasoning that the State's interest "weakens and the individual's 
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis 
dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome 
the State interest."6 In other words, as stated elsewhere in the Court record, the 
"Patient's right to privacy was greater than the State's interests in the preservation 
and sanctity of human life where patient, whose vital processes were maintained 
by mechanical respirator would never resume cognitive life."6 
The Court held that: 
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to 
terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right to privacy, as 
we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition 
prevented her conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent 
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best 
judgement, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would 
exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in the affirmative this decision 
should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of whose members would, 
we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves 
or for those closest to them. 
Accordingly, the Court determined that "Karen's right of privacy may be 
asserted in her behalf, by her guardian and family under the particular 
circumstances presented by this record."6 
Note the use of "privacy" and "choice" to rationalize further judicial sanction 
of life-ending decisions by a third-party. 
During the second six months following her arrest, Karen began to trigger the 
ventilator more frequently and she was weaned from it over a period of a month.4 
She continued to breathe on her own for another ten years. Karen eventually 
succumbed to overwhelming infection, including pneumonia and meningitis. 
Karen Ann Quinlan is dead. The New England Journal of Medicine 
editorializes: 
We owe Joseph and Julie Quinlan, Karen's parents, our gratitude for turning their 
personal calamity into a public benefit by launching the Right-to-Die movement. 
Without this movement we would not have our present rigJtts to prepare advance 
directives or living wills that permit us to name a proxy decision-maker to authorize 
discontinuation of treatment under specified circumstances.13 
We believe the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in the Karen Ann 
Quinlan case has fueled the euthanasia movement and jeopardized the lives of 
countless vulnerable persons, in particular, those living in an unconscious or 
semiconscious state. But the precise cause of Karen's condition has not been 
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established. Autopsy findings, preceded by normal CT -scans and normal 
angiograms, were inconsistent with the widespread and diffuse brain damage 
expected in the purported "persistent vegetative state" (PVS). 
Karen's treating physicians and the experts were wrong when they predicted 
that she would not survive another year. They were wrong in insisting that she 
was unaware of herself and her environment, since her father observed her 
response to touch, stroking, and combing her har .12 Physicians can err in regards 
to prognosis, as well as diagnosis. 
The Court record refers to a number of different standards governing medical 
practice: pertinent medical standards, ordinary medical standards, traditional 
medical standards, ethical standards, societal standards, and standards of civil and 
criminal law. Most importantly, there was introduction of accepted medical 
standards. 6 The initial court case (i.e., Karen's father's petition to be appointed 
her legal guardian for the purpose of making medical treatment decisions) 
included the contention that Karen was brain dead. Although the Court did not 
find that Karen was brain dead (following stipulation of the parties), nevertheless 
it accepted and applied the standard of "accepted medical standards." This is 
particularly significant inasmuch as the Uniform Determination of Death Act, a 
statute recommended for adoption by every state by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners, subsequently required the determination of death to be based on 
"accepted medical standards."14 Accepted medical standards are not sufficiently 
stringent for a matter as important as the determination of death. IS Many people 
are unaware that accepted medical standards do not preclude the presence of 
brain functions when a declaration of brain death is made.16 For instance, to 
perform an EEG and to require that the EEG evidence no activity before 
pronouncing brain death, would be within a standard that could be considered 
"pertinent, ordinary, and traditional," yet to forgo conducting an EEG prior to 
declaring brain death falls within "accepted medical standards." Indeed, 
according to Grigg and colleagues at Loyola University, Chicago, it is accepted to 
conclude and determine brain death even in the presence of activity recorded by 
the EEG.16 Since the Karen Ann Quinlan case, it is not only accepted to remove a 
ventilator from patients in a so-called persistent vegetative state, but it is also 
legally and medically accepted to deprive such individuals offood and waterP 
Such patients, receving neither food nor water, will die, as would each and 
everyone of us. And they die after experiencing 10 to 14 days of agony, torment 
which may well be felt by those being starved and dehydrated to death but would 
be unable to communicate because of not being able to move, cry out, grimace or 
show other signs of discomfort. A California district attorney described such a 
death as a "life boat death, a prison camp death, the classic death of dehydration 
and starvation,"18 while a Massachusetts judge depicted the tragic sequelae of 
deliberate starvation and dehydration.19 
Did Karen truly have PVS? The evidence from her father (see page 60) belies 
this diagnosis. She responded to her father's affectionate gestures. She could have 
likewise responded to the agony of slow death from meningitis and pneumonia in 
the last weeks of her life. In a similar way, other persons misdiagnosed as PVS 
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could die excruciating deaths from the misapplied "kindness" of death from slow 
dehydration and starvation. 
Karen died in 1985. Her brain was fixed in 20% formalin for three years and 
then examined.4 If there was a purpose or reason for this three year delay, it was 
not mentioned in the New England Journal of Medicine article. Nine years 
transpired from the time the autopsy was performed until the findings were 
reported in the New England Journal of Medicine. It would seem the authors of 
the article and the editors of the Journal would have wanted this article published 
quickly, especially since the autopsy findings differ from the medical information 
that had been provided to the Court on which the Court had based its rulings. 
Why the delays? For whatever reason(s), the delays allowed the idea of 
withdrawal of treatment, hydration, and nutrition to become acceptable to the 
public and the courts, 20, 21, 22, 23 before the flawed evidence provided by this 
paradigm case was published. ' 
"Contrary to expectation, the most severe damage was not in the cerebral 
cortex but the thalamus, and the brain stem was relatively intact." It was further 
concluded that the brain pathology was "consistent with hypoxic ischemic injury 
and cerebral edema due to the cardiopulmonary arrest that had occurred ten 
years before death."4 There is no mention of the effect of drugs, or anything other 
than hypoxia-ischema, as a possible cause of any of her brain pathology. 
Autopsy findings included severe cachexia. Karen's brain weighed only 64% of 
normal.4 Cut sections (Figure 2 in reference) were impressive for the degree of 
cortical atrophy in the parasaggital region from the precentral gyrus of the 
posterior frontal lobe to the parieto-occipital fissure. It is concluded that the 
pathologic findings are related to hypoxia and ischemia, but could extreme 
malnutrition and imbalanced caloric intake by artificially maintained 
hypercaloric [sic] feedings at one point have caused additional mechanisms for 
selective vulnerability, such as an extreme form of Wernicke's disease (BI 
avitaminosis)?24 Brain areas that could be involved in this type of vitamin 
deficiency, for example, the mammillary bodies24, were not discussed in the 
paper other than the notation of atrophy. A nutritional role was only mentioned 
by the authors in relation to degeneration of the spinal cord posterior columns4. 
The modern neuroimaging findings in cases of anorexia nervosa (as in-vivo 
models of human malnutrition) show reversible brain atrophy (pseudo-
atrophy).25, 26 While it is reversible and mild, could the same mechanism have 
caused what was found in the brain of Karen Quinlan who had "severe 
cachexia"? These questions cannot be answered simply on the basis of the 
Journal article and the Court report. But their very unanswerability would 
indicate to us that Karen's case was a poor exemplar on which to base the entire 
present day culture of death. 
There was marked atrophy of the thalamus. Linking thalamic atrophy to a 
permanent state of unconsciousness is thought-provoking. The obvious 
explanation given for the thalamic atrophy is hypoxic-ischemic insult, but when 
was the thalamus actually injured? The electroencephalogram recorded low 
voltage fast patterns, not activity of delta rhythms more characteristic of thalamic 
lesions.27 
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The same issue of the New England Journal of Medicine that reports the 
Quinlan autopsy presents a report of The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS. 
"The vegetative state is a clinical condition of complete unawareness of the 
self and the environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles with either 
complete or partial preservation of hypothalamic and brain stem automatic 
functions. "28 The principal pathologic finding following acute global hypoxia 
and ischemia is extensive necrosis of the cortex or an abnormality that 
isolated the cortex from the other parts ofthe brain.The EEG usually shows 
diffuse and generalized abnormalities. Computed tomographic imaging in 
patients in a persistent vegetative state often reveals diffuse or multi focal 
cerebral disease involving the gray and the white matter.28 
The Court sanctioned the removal of Karen Ann Quinlan's respirator 
because it found that she was in a persistent vegetative state. Yet, the autopsy, 
the EEG, CT-scan, and the angiograms did not evidence the customary 
findings associated with this purported state. Likewise the pathological 
findings were not consistent with the expected findings of "extensive 
multifocal or diffuse laminar cortical necrosis."28 Indeed, the autopsy 
confirmed that the major pathology in the brain of Karen Ann Quinlan was in 
the thalamus, a small part of the brain. 
If the Court had been aware that the major pathology in Karen's brain was 
known to be in a relatively small part of her brain known as the thalamus, 
would that have affected its decision? If the Court had known that she didn't 
require a ventilator for her breathing and would live another ten years 
breathing on her own, would it have ruled differently? If the Court had 
foreseen that the cause of Karen's unconsciousness would never be clearly 
established, would this insight have informed the Court's decision? 
And if the Court could have foretold that as a result of its ruling, such 
consequences as launching the Right-to-Die movement, promoting living 
wills, legalizing the fatal removal of food and water, and "assisted" suicide 
might ensue, would the Court have ruled otherwise? 
Not much was found wrong with the cerebral cortex. The predominant 
pathology was in the thalamus when "neocortical death" was expected. In 
retrospect the Karen Ann Quinlan case was a poor one to base a policy 
utilizing "partial" brain death, especially involving the neocortex, as a criteria 
for withdrawal of treatment, food and water. 
Our conclusion is that the foundational case for terminating such treatment 
for patients in coma or persistent vegetative state is flawed because of a failure 
to properly investigate and diagnose this patient's condition. Its conclusions 
were unwarranted because the cause of her condition was never clarified. She 
responded to pain, coughed and gagged. She responded to soothing touches 
by her father. She had normal CT-scan and normal angiograms which were 
not consistent with the brain damage espoused by the physicians. Finally, the 
autopsy findings are not the expected widespread and diffuse damage, rather 
the major pathology was in the thalamus, a relative small part of the brain. 
Hasn't the foundational case for the 'Right-to-Die ' Movement been built on 
sand? 
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